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1 INTRODUCTION  
Power grid reliability requirements enacted by inter-
national and national level standards require avoid-
ing electrical service outages. The outage of power 
delivery must be in the range of no more than 5 
minutes per year to achieve higher availability 
(99.999%). 
In (Altaher et al. 2015), experimental setup was 
conducted to evaluate critical communication in a 
testbed of process-level network. The evaluation is 
done, with framework of the IEC 61850 standard, by 
implementing communication protocols.  
In this paper we aim to investigate dependability of 
bay-level hardware architectures inside an IEC 
61850-based distribution substation. Our approach 
uses reliability block diagrams and the safety integri-
ty approach framework from the international stand-
ards IEC 61508, to investigate reliability, availabil-
ity and safety availability in this context. 
This paper is organized in five sections. Second 
section identifies briefly the electrical power grid. 
Third section introduces the IEC 61850 substation 
communication standard, its features and concepts; 
in sub-section 3 we emphasis a distribution substa-
tion. In section 4, we detail the dependability con-
cept and its attributes. Proposed architecture with re-
liability and availability calculations are mentioned 
in sub-section 3 whereas sub-section 4 proposes an 
evaluation of the functional safety. Section 5 con-
cludes the paper. 
 
2 THE ELECTRICAL POWER GRID 
The electrical power delivery follows many stages 
from power generation through transmission and 
distribution to the ultimate main load centers. Practi-
cally the electrical power grid composes of power 
stations, cabling system, transmission and distribu-
tion substations and related control centers. The in-
terconnection of these subsystems becomes progres-
sively intelligent forming the smart grid. The grid 
exchanges automatically real time, electrical power, 
parameters enabling utilities to manage and control 
remotely all components and to manipulate the grid 
reliability and safety (McDonald et al.  2013). Mod-
ern grids have telecommunication networks support-
ing distributed protection and control functions in-
side the substations. Further, the power system 
includes extra-high voltage (EHV) networks used to 
transmit electricity from power generation stations 
to distribution networks known as high-voltage 
(HV) networks. End consumers are connected to the 
distribution facilities, i.e. substations. Electrical sub-
stations build coordinated transmission and distribu-
tion nodes, which are configured by control centers 
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to maintain the health of the power grid. Smart tech-
nologies and intelligent devices protect and control 
substation functionalities either locally or remotely 
by means of information and communication tech-
nologies. The IEC 61850 standard, communication 
networks and systems in substations, drives interop-
erability between several substation devices, e.g. in-
telligent electronic devices (IEDs), from different 
vendors. Additionally, the standard provides flexible 
assignment of different functions that enhance safe-
ty-related functions (Brand et al 2004). 
 
3 THE IEC 61850 STANDARD 
The technical committee 57 (TC57), which belongs 
to The International Electro-technical Commission 
(IEC), has released the IEC 61850 standard to en-
force interoperability and to enable abstraction of 
communication services (IEC TC57. 2010). Its parts 
manage standardization of different services dedi-
cated for vertical and horizontal communications in-
side substation levels. It enables delivery of high-
speed peer-to-peer messages for status and events 
exchange. The standards includes at least 10 parts, 
the first five parts identify general and specific func-
tional requirements. Part 6 covers an engineering 
tools such as substation configuration language to 
manage the design configurations by allowing de-
scription of relations between substation functions, 
substation primary or/and secondary equipment. Part 
7 includes 4 sub parts identifying abstraction and 
mapping of data services to communication proto-
cols. Part 8 defines manufacturing message services 
(MMS) mapping to data services. Part 9 also has sub 
parts, part 9-1 defines mapping of sampled values 
(SV) and 9-2 deals with the Process-bus. Part 10 
emphasizes procedures of conformance testing. 
3.1 IEC 61850 Standard features 
The substation automation systems benefit from the 
standard parts at different levels (station, bay and 
process levels). Inherited engineering models are en-
forced by the standard providing new capabilities 
such as object-oriented data modeling, communica-
tion mapping services, configuration tools such as 
substation configuration language, and new process- 
level instrumentation technologies. These capabili-
ties paved the way for horizontal communications 
between distributed devices inside substation levels. 
In result, the IEDs cooperate in real-time, to enable 
distribution of functionalities, by using Ethernet 
network technology. The substation primary equip-
ment is controlled by dedicated formal device func-
tion numbers (IEEE std. C37.2 2008). The IEC 
61850 part 5 introduces standardized logical nodes 
(LN) to define these functions. Logical nodes are 
embedded into the IEDs to form logical devices that 
are defined by specific requirements. Obviously, the 
IEDs are programmable devices that provide protec-
tion and control functions. These devices contain 
logic solvers, input and output ports, network inter-
faces to gather information about the primary 
equipment via communication protocols. GOOSE 
(general object oriented substation events) messages 
are multi-casted from publishers (IEDs) to subscrib-
ers (IEDs) in real-time pattern. These messages are 
important for delivering status (data set) about pri-
mary equipment parameters, e.g. circuit breaker 
switch position and status. Other specific messages 
called sampled values (SV) are used to inform bay-
level devices about the process-level measured phys-
ical parameters, i.e. voltage and current. Innovative 
merging units (MU) are used to convert analog pa-
rameters and to transmit synchronously the sampled 
values with precise time-synchronization (IEC 
61850 part 9-2). 
3.2 The IEC 61850 object modeling 
The standard defines object models to enforce in-
teroperability between IEDs from different vendors. 
These models help reducing costs and time required 
for configuration of SAS implementations, and im-
proving engineering documentation.  As mentioned 
earlier logical nodes are models that form basic 
functionalities. A logical node is the smallest part of 
a function that exchange data (IEC TC 57. 2010). It 
contains data object and methods used to create 
functional components of different classes. These 
classes provide different protection, measurement, 
control, monitoring functions in SAS operations. 
Among these IEC 61850 defined classes are XCBR 
circuit breaker, XSWI isolator or earth switch, 
TCTR Current transformer, YLTC power transform-
er, PTOC time overcurrent protection and 
ATCC automatic tap changer controller. Interopera-
bility between logical nodes achieved through stand-
ardized data objects included in every logical node. 
Three levels of data modeling and services are con-
sidered. The first level is the abstract communication 
service interface (ACSI) that allocates models and 
associated services for accessing data and object el-
ements. The second level is common data classes 
(CDC) that specify data attributes while the third 
level defines logical node classes and data classes. 
These levels represent hierarchical levels (Fig.1). 
Alongside this concept, an intelligent electronic de-
vice, i.e. physical device PHD, could be constructed 
by one or several logical devices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Hierarchical object modeling 
3.3 The distribution substation under study 
We choose the transformer bay (Fig. 2), in distribu-
tion substation, as a case study to analyze the func-
tional components according to the IEC 61850 
standard. We start by identifying specific compo-
nents such as primary and secondary equipment. The 
primary equipment is the main process-level circuits 
composed of a bus bar, power lines, feeders and 
transformers, while secondary devices are bay-level 
auxiliary devices such as monitoring, protection and 
control devices. The bay-level in the substation is 
used logically between station-level and process-
level equipment. The station-level consists of engi-
neering computers, human machine interfaces, su-
pervisory control and data acquisition, tele-control 
access, whereas the process-level is composed of 
electrical power equipment, e.g. circuit breakers.  
 
Planning a SAS design requires drawing of a sin-
gle line diagram (Fig. 2) that shows process-level 
components. Electromechanical equipment such as 
disconnectors and CBs are shown. The power trans-
former, i.e. converting high voltage into a lower 
voltage levels, converts 34.5 kV into 13.8 kV. This 
transformer bay forms a small distribution (D1-2) 
substation architecture (IEC 61850-1 2010). In other 
hand, additional components: bus bar, line, breakers 
and disconnectors are interconnected to construct the 
primary switchgear. These components are con-
trolled by local/remote commands via a local Ether-
net network. The bay-level would include protection 
and control IEDs that handle functionalities of the 
process-level and gather information about the 
equipment. The protection and control IEDs are in-
terconnected via communication network (Fig. 2). 
 
 
4 DEPENDABILITY OF SAS SYSTEMS  
Dependability is defined as the trustworthiness of a 
computer system such that reliance can justifiably be 
placed on the service it delivers. The service deliv-
ered by a system is its behavior as it is perceived by 
its users; a user is another system (human or physi-
cal) which interacts with the former (Laprie 1992). 
Additionally, it is defined as the ability to perform as 
and when required (IEC 60050-191). Dependability 
is a collective set of time-related performance char-
acteristics that coexist with other requirements such 
as output, efficiency, quality, safety, security and in-
tegrity (Hardeveld & Kiang 2012). 
 
4.1 Reliability and availability of process level 
Reliability is defined as continuity of service, in oth-
er definition it is defined as a measure of continuous 
delivery of correct service or, equivalently, of time 
to failure (Laprie 1992) while IEC TC56 committee 
defines reliability as the probability that an item ful-
fils the required functions for the required duration.  
 
In power utility communication systems, IEC 61850 
part 3 section 4 considers reliability as quality re-
quirement by focusing on communications for sub-
station automation networking services. The stand-
ard provides a reference for other standards such as 
IEC 60870-4 that specifies performance require-
ments for tele-control. Further, IEC 61850 identifies 
the reliability of communications, inside the substa-
tion different levels, as data exchange without fail-
ure, loss or delay of critical messages. Precisely, 
there should be no single point of failure (SPOF) in 
substation networks. If failures exist, outcomes may 
cause damage to substation equipment. 
The standard insists that communication reliability is 
needed as a requirement for substation automation; 
therefore, it recommends fail-safe design that should 
be handled to avoid undesired control action.  
 
The availability is defined as readiness of usage, and 
as a measure of the delivery of correct service with 
respect to the alteration of correct and incorrect ser-
vice (Laprie, 1992). IEC TC56 illustrates: “the 
availability is extent to which an item is operational 
and able to perform any required function or set of 
functions if a demand is placed on it”.  Evidently, 
one can recognize the relation between the dependa-
bility attributes. 
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Figure.2 Substation communications among different levels, Logical Nodes within IEDs 
The availability is derived from reliability, safety 
and integrity (Hardeveld & Kiang 2012). Hence, the 
dependability has different attributes (Laprie 1992) 
such as reliability, availability, safety and security. 
In addition, IEC TC56, which is responsible for de-
pendability management standards, defines core de-
pendability attributes that include reliability, availa-
bility, maintainability and maintenance support. 
The current practice in the field of power transmis-
sion and distribution requires dependable networks 
to deliver continuous electrical energy. Power sub-
stations contribute directly to the power system reli-
ability and availability. Transmission and distribu-
tion substations process-level equipment is the main 
concern for evaluating substation role on general 
power system reliability. The substation availability 
depends mainly on primary and secondary equip-
ment failure rates, communication topology, redun-
dancy, maintenance procedures and support…   
In previous work (Altaher et al. 2015), the authors 
investigate reliability of process-level network with-
in an IEC 61850 enabled communication services. In 
this paper, we aim to evaluate hardware architec-
tures considering redundant components.  
4.2 Safety and functional safety 
Safety is avoidance of catastrophic consequences on 
people, property and environment; hence, reducing 
risk frequency and consequence is primary objective 
for safety systems. In this manner, safety is a meas-
ure of continuous safeness, or equivalently, of time 
to catastrophic failure (Laprie 1992).  
Functional safety is a part of overall safety that de-
pends on the correct functioning of the process or 
equipment in response to its inputs (IEC TC 65. 
2010). 
Protection functions in substations were found to be 
safety related with varying levels of risk (Purewal & 
Waldron 2004). These functions construct principal 
protection layer to prevent hazardous. Among these 
hazardous events are; short-circuits, arc flash and in-
ter-phase short-circuits. Switchgear equipment faults 
could lead to critical failures such that failing to 
force sequential clearance of faults. In result, these 
events cause hazard consequences against substation 
technicians.  
For practical design reasons, disconnectors in pro-
cess-level are not able to switch on/off higher cur-
rent loads (Zurakowski 2000). Technically, these 
disconnectors are used for isolation clearance be-
tween disconnected elements, which cannot be 
achieved by circuit breakers. Switching-off a line 
requires sequential procedure performed in timely 
adjusted mechanism to avoid any damage. Perfect 
example is when tripping circuit breaker, in case of 
failing or delayed command that might cause late re-
action. Consequence could be an electrical arc ac-
companied by high rate optic and acoustic phenom-
ena, causing spray of melted iron and flashovers. 
Another consequences may include inter-phase 
short-circuit leading to damage of equipment and in-
jury of nearby people.  
The loss of disconnector would cost procurement of 
new equipment, replacement time, partial power 
outage and probability of critical accidents. E.g. the 
wrong switching-off of a loaded line by the related 
disconnector. The potential consequences will cost 
damage of process-level equipment and switchgear 
devices. In addition, substation disturbance could 
cause partial interruption of power distribution. 
In (Prata et al. 2011) failure mode analysis was per-
formed on MV substation to identify the components 
that were more likely to cause an interruption. That 
analysis has shown the most critical component in 
the studied substation is power transformer. Another 
failure mode analysis was done by (Zurakowski 
2000) to evaluate risks and their consequences on 
HV power substations. In our study, we consider 
both; a) the above mentioned failure modes that 
cause risks for substation staff and switchgear 
equipment, and b) the risk matrix which is elaborat-
ed by (Prata et al. 2011). 
4.3 Integration and separation 
Many standards recommend separation of control 
systems from safety functions, e.g. Institute of Elec-
trical and Electronics Engineering standards (IEEE) 
recommend that the safety system design shall be 
such other systems failures shall not prevent the 
safety system form meeting its requirements. Fur-
thermore, ANSI/ISA (American National Standards 
Institute/International Society of Automation) men-
tioned that separation between basic process control 
system (BPCS) and safety instrumentation system 
(SIS) functions reduce the probability that both con-
trol and safety functions become unavailable at the 
same time, or that inadvertent changes affect the 
safety functionality of the SIS. Contrary, in many 
substation design requirements, protection and con-
trol systems are integrated. Functional safety impos-
es separation of protection functions from control 
system to avoid common cause failures.  
 In the protection and control, the process of specify-
ing the degree of targeted safety should concern the 
associated risk assessment. Concerning the safety 
probability per function, designers of SAS safety-
related functions estimate a tolerable failure with 
probability of 10-5/h to 10-6/h (Brand et al, 2004).  
One measure for the functional safety is the proba-
bility of failure on demand when a system fails to 
respond to a demand for action arising from a poten-
tially hazardous condition (IEC TC 65. 2010). This 
parameter increases during mission time or test in-
terval.  
4.4 Reliability, availability and safety metrics 
For dependability evaluation, the combinatory mod-
el of reliability block diagram (RBD) is used to illus-
trate the functional components, and for analyzing 
different system architectures such as parallel, se-
ries, non-parallel and series. A system works if there 
is path of functioning components. Comparing other 
methods such as fault trees (FT), reliability graphs, 
Bayesian networks and Markov models, this model 
is an effective tool that provide flexibility to deter-
mine reliability of system by considering its compo-
nents. Evaluation of dependability concerns; hard-
ware components, communication network as 
component and redundancy of critical components 
to avoid single point of failure. Protection and con-
trol subsystems are allocated in series arrangements, 
while redundant components are represented by par-
allel arrangements. These arrangements are required 
when one subsystem replace another subsystem. 
Assuming useful life period and constant failure 
rates (i.e. exponentially distributed lifetime), the fol-
lowing formulas give expressions for calculating re-
liability by given metrics such as mean time to fail-
ure (MTTF), mean time to repair (MTTR), i.e. 
average time from detecting the failure of a compo-
nent until its replacement. Eq.1 gives an expression 
of failure rate as reciprocal of MTTF 
 
iMTTF
i
1
=λ                (1) 
 
Where, λi is failure rate of ith component. The relia-
bility function of component i is given by Eq.2:  
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−
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Where t is the mission time for a component in use-
ful life period. 
 
Figure.3:  three different process/bay level architectures 
 
Series system reliability, Rs(t) is given by Eq.3, as-
suming independent failure of individual compo-
nents. 
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Parallel system reliability (non-repairable compo-
nents), Rp(t), correspondingly, is given by Eq.4:  
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Where Qi(t) is the unreliability of ith component, and 
it is given by Eq.5: 
 
tλi1)( −−= etQi               (5) 
 
Furthermore, to evaluate availability, following for-
mulas use repair (µ) and failure (λ) rates to calculate 
the availability. Repair rate (replacing a component) 
is given by Eq.6: 
i
i MTTR
1
=µ
               (6) 
Then, availability Ai of ith component will be calcu-
lated by using MTTF and MTTR metrics as given in 
Eq.7: 
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i
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         (7) 
Similarly, the availability formula, using repair and 
failure rates, is given in Eq.8: 
ii
i
iA λµ
µ
+
=
              (8) 
To evaluate the safety availability, tolerable 
risk/failure, non-protected failure is required to de-
termine the risk reduction factor RRF. Eq.9 gives an 
expression to find the RRF:  
t
np
F
F
RRF =
               (9) 
Where Fnp is the unprotected risk frequency that 
equals dangerous undetected failures, i.e. PFD for 
low demand and PFH for high demand, and Ft is tol-
erable risk frequency which is mentioned early (see 
section 4.3). PFDavg is given by Eq.10: 
 
RRF
avgPFD
1
=
            (10) 
 
where RRF represents the risk reduction factor. In 
Eq.11, safety availability is given by knowing the 
PFDavg. 
avgPFDSA −= 1
            (11) 
 
The following table (Table 1) contains the MTTF 
values that are obtained from (Brand et al 2003, 
Lindquist et al 2008), these figures will be used for 
reliability, availability and safety availability calcu-
lations. 
 
Table 1: Components MTTF and MTTR values 
Component MTTF  
(Years) 
MTTR 
(Hours) 
Bay IED 150 8 
Ethernet Switch 50 4 
Merging Unit 150 8 
CB IED 100 8 
Transformer IED 150 8 
Time source 150 4 
 
From the given metrics, reliability, i.e. mission time 
is 1000 hours, and availability are calculated for the 
three architectures (table 3).  
 
Table 2: Safety Integrity Levels and the Probability of Failures on Demand 
Safety Integrity Levels 1 2 3 4 
Safety Availability 90%-99% 99%-99.9% 99.9%-99.99% Non relevant 
Risk Reduction Factor 10 to 100 100 to 1000 1000 to 10,000 10,000 to 100,000 
Average Probability of Failure on Demand-
 
Low rate demand 
>=10-2 to 10-1 >=10-3 to 10-2 >=10-4 to 10-3 >=10-5 to 10-4 
Failure rate (λ) per hour - high rate demand >=10-6 to 10-5 >=10-7 to 10-6 >=10-8 to 10-7 >=10-9 to 10-8 
 
The results are given in table 3 as following: 
 
Table 3: Protection and control architectures reliability and 
availability 
Architecture  Reliability % Availability % 
Basic 99.24185353 99.99512951 
Redundant Ethernet 99.31740880 99.99604270 
Redundant Bay IED 99.34260667 99.99665150 
 
Transformer protection and control function is a 
SRS function that simultaneously controls line, bus 
bar and transformer bays equipment, including con-
trolling transformer tap position, CB and discon-
nectors switches tripping (opening). This function 
does operate in continuous (high mode). Considering 
(table 2), high demand rate requires probability of 
failure rates per hour (PFH) which is the average 
dangerous frequency of failure per hour of compo-
nents or subsystems.  
The IEC 61508 standard sets SIL level according to 
dangerous failure rates as explained in table 3. We 
assume as in the standard (IEC TC 65. 2010) that 
statistically only every other failure is a potentially 
dangerous failure. For complex devices failure 
modes are assumed and divided as 50% safe and 
50% dangerous. This assumption is explained in 
Eq.12. 
 
λλλ ×==
2
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The Eq.1 thus holds for λD, which equals in this case 
1/MTTFD, for determining both dangerous undetect-
ed λDU failure rate and dangerous detected λDD, 
Eq.13 and Eq.14 are used: 
 
)1( DCDDU −×= λλ         (13) 
 
 
 
DCDDD ×= λλ              (14) 
 
The channel equivalent mean down time (tCE) is cal-
culated according to the standard in Eq.15 
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In this manner we can determine the probability of 
failure per hour PFH in Eq.16 
ceλdt1 −−= ePFH
            (16) 
 
For redundant components with MooN structure, de-
signers should consider common cause failures, rep-
resented by β factor (IEC TC 65. 2010). For 1oo2 
structure, we assume that β=0.04, and βD=0.02,i.e. 
dangerous common cause factor, for both redundant 
Ethernet switches and bay IEDs. PFH is given by: 
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Where tGE (group down time) is given by Eq.18: 
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and DC is the (automatic) diagnostic coverage (as-
sumed 90% coverage) and T1 is the proof-test inter-
val (assumed 1 month). Eq.19 gives the total failure 
rate of the SIF system (series): 
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For two identical components with constant failures, 
the total failure rate, i.e. 1oo2 redundancy is given 
by Eq.20 
 
3
2 i
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              (20) 
4.5 Calculating functional safety metrics 
The above-mentioned formulas are used for estimat-
ing the PFH of the three safety related architectures 
(Fig. 3) and the results are tabulated in (table 4). 
 
Table 4: probability of failure per hour (PFH) and safety avail-
ability of SRS functions for proposed architectures 
Architecture  PFH Safety Availability % 
Basic 3.8E-06 99.9996 
Redundant Ethernet 2.7E-06 99.9997 
Redundant Bay IED 2.3E-06 99.9998 
 
From table 3 and table 4, we can notice clearly that 
two architectures with redundant components are 
satisfying IEC 61850 requirement, i.e. avoiding sin-
gle point of failure, the architecture 3 has a higher 
reliability protection function regarding its lower 
dangerous failure and overall failure rate. These ar-
chitectures are all suitable for SIL 1 level (high de-
mand). Figure 4 illustrates decreasing of the reliabil-
ity with mission time increasing.  
 
Figure.4:  reliability of the three architectures 
 
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
We evaluate three process-level architectures by 
applying classical reliability methods. Safety availa-
bility of these architectures is evaluated by using 
functional safety approach. 
 
First architecture is basic well-known process-
level/bay-level topology, which already exists in 
many distribution substations. The second proposed 
architecture benefits from Ethernet switch redundan-
cy to eliminate SPOF in case of communication 
faults, furthermore, the third proposed architecture 
uses redundant bay device to increase availability of 
main-bay protection and control. In future research, 
we will evaluate availability of shared logical nodes, 
therefore a detailed analysis of Ethernet communica-
tion network traffic, and the switching mechanism in 
relation with worst-case load will be performed 
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